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Abstract 
I argue that rights-forfeiture by itself is no path to permissibility at all (even barring special 
circumstances), neither in the case of self-defense nor in the case of punishment. The limiting 
conditions of self-defense, for instance – necessity, proportionality (or no gross 
disproportionality), and the subjective element – are different in the context of forfeiture than 
in the context of justification (and might even be absent in the former context). In particular, I 
argue that a culpable aggressor, unlike an innocent aggressor, forfeits rights against 
proportionate defense, including unnecessary defense (as well as rights against the infliction 
of proportionate non-defensive harm). Yet, I demonstrate that this stance need not lead to the 
abandonment of the necessity condition of justified self-defense in the case of a culpable 
aggressor. Since justification and liability are not the same, there is no reason to assume that 
the necessity condition of justified self-defense must be explained under an appeal to the 
aggressor’s rights. Parallel arguments apply to the other limiting conditions of permissible 
self-defense as well as to the limiting conditions of permissible punishment. Accordingly, I 
also sketch alternative explanations of the proportionality requirement and the subjective 
element. All these alternative explanations appeal to a principle of precaution: instead of 
explaining the unjustifiability of unnecessarily harming a culpable attacker or wrongdoer by 
an appeal to the rights of the attacker or wrongdoer himself, one can also, and better, explain 
it by a requirement to take reasonable precautions against violating the rights of innocent 
people. 
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Introduction 
In this paper, I shall argue that rights forfeiture1 or liability2 must be distinguished from 
permissibility or justification and that certain important conclusions from this distinction 
                                                
1 There are different definitions of “forfeiture.” On some definitions, to forfeit a right means 
to lose it through one’s own responsible/accountable action. On other definitions, to forfeit a 
right simply means to lose it. For the purposes of this discussion, I use the former definition. 
2 On the definition used here, a person is liable to some way of being treated, for example 
liable to attack or to punishment, if this person would not be wronged by this treatment, that 
is, if the person’s rights would not be violated or infringed by this treatment. In other words, 
a person is liable to attack or to punishment if the person has no right not to be attacked or 
punished. Whether the person can, for instance, only become liable to “necessary” attack or 
punishment is a substantive question that should not be preempted by definitional fiat. 
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must be drawn. To wit, while some authors explicitly grant the analytical distinction, they 
nevertheless claim that a culpable aggressor’s liability to self-defensive force or to 
punishment explains (at least in a large array of cases, that is, barring special circumstances) 
the defender’s permission to engage in self-defense or to punish the aggressor. I will call this 
claim here the rights forfeiture theory of permissible self-defense or punishment, or rights-
forfeiture theory for short. One can reject (as I do) rights-forfeiture theory without denying 
(as I do not) the existence of cases of rights-forfeiture. 
The analytical distinction itself between forfeiture/liability on the one hand and 
justification on the other is not difficult to grasp. From so-called “necessity justifications” or 
“choice of evil justifications” it is well known that sometimes it can be justified to infringe a 
person’s rights for the sake of a much greater good. For example, if someone has a heart 
attack in front of the window of a closed pharmacy at night, and the only way Pauline can 
save him is to smash the window and give him the life-saving drug, then morally, and legally 
in many jurisdictions, Pauline is justified in doing so although she thereby infringes the 
property rights of the pharmacy owner. This is shown in the fact that legally (and morally) 
Pauline would owe him compensation for the smashed window;3 yet, while she owes him 
compensation, she is not punishable. In fact, she is not only excused but fully justified. Thus, 
we are dealing here with a justified rights infringement: you can justifiably do something to 
someone (for example damage his or her property) although she or he has a right against you 
doing it. 
But if you can justifiably do something to someone although he has a right against you 
doing it, then one should assume that, conversely, one can also unjustifiably do something to 
someone although he has no right against you doing it. If he has no right against you doing it, 
then this means, conversely, that you have (in the Hohfeldian terminology4) a so-called 
“privilege” or “no-duty,” or, as it is now mostly called, a liberty against him to do it. That is, 
you have no duty towards him not to do it. For example, let us assume that the owner of the 
pharmacy has explicitly waived his right against Pauline that she not smash his window 
whenever she likes (it would be good business for him if a celebrity smashed his window); 
and let us further assume that Pauline would really like to smash his window. However, she 
knows that the insane but powerful brother of the owner will kill 100 innocent people if she 
indeed smashes the window. In this case, she should not smash the window although 
smashing it would not infringe the owner’s rights. 
Thus, just as you can have a necessity justification overriding the rights of someone (the 
owner of the pharmacy) for the greater good, you can also have what could be called a 
necessity prohibition, which overrides the liberty of someone (Pauline) for the greater good. 
This establishes the distinction between rights forfeiture/liability/lack of a right on the one 
hand and justification on the other. But while noting this analytical distinction is important 
enough, it is equally important to note that rights forfeiture and justification do not just come 
                                                
3 This is sometimes denied, but I do not think the denial is plausible. See Uwe Steinhoff, 
“The Liability of Justified Attackers,” unpublished ms. section 5. 
4 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning and Other Legal Essays (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919). 
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apart in such special or extreme circumstances, where the good achieved (or the evil avoided) 
by not exercising a liberty (which, again, one gained through someone’s forfeiting or waiving 
a right) by far outweighs the good of exercising it. Rather, even under normal circumstances, 
where the costs of doing to someone what he has no right that one not do it to him are not 
prohibitively high, rights forfeiture alone justifies nothing. For instance, if the owner had 
waived his right against Pauline’s smashing his window but Pauline had forgotten about it, 
then her vandalistic smashing of the window would still be morally unjustified: she should 
not smash the window since her action (for all she knows she is violating the owner’s rights 
for no good reason) shows a blatant disregard towards law, morality, and, of course, the 
owner’s rights. 
In short, showing that somebody has forfeited his right not to be attacked and is thus liable 
to attack – that is, has no right not to be attacked – and even showing furthermore that there is 
no necessity prohibition or other special circumstance that would override the liberty of a 
potential attacker is still not the same as showing that one can justifiably attack her – that is, 
that such an attack does not contravene morality (or law, in the case of legal justification). 
Not all moral (or legal) constraints against doing something to someone (for example 
attacking her) lie in that person’s rights, and not all permissions lie in a person’s liberty. 
Some philosophers who think that rights forfeiture is a path to permissibility or 
justification (at least under normal circumstances) are, of course, well aware of the fact that 
justification is subject to certain constraints, like necessity, proportionality, and certain 
subjective or epistemic elements. Yet, they think that all these constraints are internal to 
rights-forfeiture, so that one can only forfeit one’s rights against necessary, proportionate 
measures that are done with the proper state of mind. If this were the case, rights-forfeiture 
would indeed be a straightforward path to permissibility and justification. 
I will argue in this paper, however, that this is not the case. That is, I do not argue against 
rights-forfeiture as such; on the contrary, I agree that people can sometimes forfeit certain 
rights, and I also agree that this can then play an important part in the justification of what 
one may justifiably do to them. However, I deny that rights-forfeiture is by itself (and even 
barring necessity prohibitions etc.) a path to permissibility.5 My focus will be on self-defense, 
but parallel arguments could be made for the case of punishment. I shall argue that the 
limiting conditions of self-defense – necessity, (no gross dis-)proportionality, and the 
subjective element6 – are different (or even absent) in the context of forfeiture than in the 
                                                
5 There are, in my view, further shortcomings of rights-forfeiture theory, but they are not a 
concern of this paper.  
6 I do not discuss the imminence requirement here, which is in my view part of the triggering 
conditions for the applicability of the self-defense justification: self-defense is directed 
against ongoing or imminent attacks. See also Paul Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses (St. 
Paul: West Publishing, 1984), p. 75, who admits that in many statutes “the word ‘imminent’ 
appears to modify the nature of the triggering conditions,” but himself thinks that it is “more 
properly viewed as a modification of the necessity requirement.” Some authors deny that it is 
a valid condition for justified self-defense at all. These issues need not concern us here. 
However, I deal with them at length in “Self-Defense and Imminence,” unpublished ms. 
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context of justification (section 1). It is not my aim to provide detailed accounts of these 
conditions here;7 rather my aim is to give at least initial plausibility to the claim that their 
shape cannot be explained by reliance on forfeiture (alone). For example, I argue (in section 
2) that a culpable aggressor, unlike an innocent aggressor, forfeits rights against proportionate 
defense, including unnecessary proportionate defense. Yet, I demonstrate that this stance 
need not lead to the abandonment of the necessity condition of justified self-defense in the 
case of a culpable aggressor. That someone has forfeited his right against being harmed or, in 
an alternative terminology, is liable to be harmed, does not mean that you can justifiably 
harm him: it only means that you can harm him without violating his rights. But if 
justification and liability are not the same, then there is no reason to assume that the necessity 
condition of justified self-defense must be explained under an appeal to the aggressor’s rights 
(section 3.1). Parallel arguments apply to the other limiting conditions, and I will therefore 
also sketch alternative explanations of the proportionality requirement (section 3.2) and the 
subjective element (section 3.3). All these alternative explanations appeal to a principle of 
precaution: for instance, instead of explaining the unjustifiability of unnecessarily harming a 
culpable attacker by an appeal to the rights of the attacker himself, one can also, and better, 
explain it by a requirement to take reasonable precautions against violating the rights of 
innocent people. 
 
1. The Importance of the Distinction between Permissibility and Liability for the Limiting 
Conditions 
Why should one, for instance, accept a necessity criterion as a limiting condition for self-
defense? This seems (as we will see) to be a particularly hard question to answer for those 
who think that permissible self-defense (at least in paradigmatic cases involving an innocent 
victim and a culpable aggressor) involves rights forfeiture or liability on the part of the 
aggressor. The basic idea of such an approach is that the aggressor through his aggression 
forfeits his own right not to be attacked, that is, he becomes liable to counter-attack: he can 
now be attacked without wronging him, without violating his rights. This view, at least as far 
as culpable attackers are concerned, seems to be a very popular one at least in philosophical 
discussions of self- and other-defense,8 and many subscribe to it even in the case of innocent 
attackers.9 The advantage of this view is that it can straightforwardly explain why the 
defender does not owe the aggressor compensation for the harm the former inflicted on the 
latter in justified self-defense: by harming him he did not wrong him, did not violate his 
rights, and therefore no compensation is due. Accounts, on the other hand, that in one way or 
                                                
7 I do so elsewhere, see ibid., as well as in “Self-Defense and Necessity,” unpublished ms., 
and in “Against Purely Objectivist Interpretations of Moral Obligation,” work in progress.  
8 Philosophers as diverse as Judith Jarvis Thomson, Jeff McMahan, David Rodin, Yitzhak 
Benbaji, or Jonathan Quong, to just name a few, subscribe to it. 
9 I also subscribe to the idea that the attacker forfeits his right against counter-attack, but I do 
not subscribe to the idea that this “grounds” the permissibility of self-defense. Compare 
Suzanne Uniacke, Permissible killing: The self-defence justification of homicide (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch. 5, esp. p. 191. 
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another construct the self-defense justification as some kind of necessity justification (that is, 
as a justification that justifies overriding rights of others) cannot really explain this, at least 
not in any straightforward manner.10 After all, if one harms an aggressor, in particular a 
culpable aggressor, in necessary and proportionate self-defense one does not owe him any 
compensation. In contrast, if one harms another person in the course of overriding a right of 
this person, one would normally owe him compensation. There might be an additional 
necessity justification for not giving him the compensation (e.g., the King threatened to kill 
some innocent people in case the person whose rights have been overridden is compensated), 
but that does not change the fact that compensation is due to the person. He has a right to it, a 
right that is now violated by the King. Perhaps (although I doubt this) it is also not always the 
case that the attacker who violates (justifiably or not) another person’s rights and harms the 
person owes this person compensation: for example, perhaps not in such circumstances where 
other parties violated the attacker’s rights by unjustly putting him in a situation where he had 
to override somebody else’s rights to avert harm from himself. The fact remains, however, 
that someone owes the person who has been harmed in the course of a rights violation 
compensation.11 
A further, and perhaps even more severe problem faced by an account which claims that 
the rights of the attacker are merely overridden is that it seems to ignore the very essence of 
rights, namely that they function as some kind of trumps, as extremely weighty 
considerations. For sure, they can be overridden in extreme circumstances on the basis of a 
necessity justification, for example when one has to violate the right to life of one person in 
order to protect the rights to life of 100 other persons. However, the idea that one defender 
might override the right to life of another person to keep his own right to life from being 
violated seems to simply ignore what rights are.12 
Thus, appeals to rights forfeiture are very attractive and plausible when it comes to 
explaining certain aspects of self-defense. Yet, a number of authors have argued that rights 
forfeiture or “liability” theory has difficulties explaining why a culpable aggressor should 
only be liable to necessary force. As Joshua Dressler states, “if forfeiture explained the 
defense, an aggressor would forfeit the right to complain when the other party attempted to 
kill him, even when such a killing was unnecessary; yet lethal self-defense does not result in 
acquittal when the person attacked can avoid his own death by less extreme tactics.”13 
                                                
10 For a critique of such accounts, see Uwe Steinhoff, “Justifying Defense against Non-
Responsible Threats and Justified Aggressors: The Liability vs. the Rights-Infringement 
Account,” unpublished ms, available at http://philpapers.org/rec/STEJDA. 
11 While there are admittedly some authors who deny this, it is certainly the standard view 
and an intuitively very plausible one.  
12 Jonathan Quong, “Killing in Self-Defense,” Ethics 119 (2009), pp. 507-537, tries to 
overcome this problem. I argue that he fails in “Justifying Defense against Non-Responsible 
Threats and Justified Aggressors.” 
13 Joshua Dressler, “Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale,” 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 73 (1982), pp. 421-470, at 454. Dressler’s own 
“explanation” of the necessity condition begs the question, claiming that unnecessary lethal 
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Yet, Dressler is committing a mistake here: he implicitly presupposes that if the aggressor 
cannot complain, then the defender must be acquitted. But of course that does not follow. 
Permissibility or justification are not the same as right-forfeiture or liability.14 Unfortunately, 
most authors arguing that the aggressor does forfeit certain rights (against counter-attack and 
punishment, for example) make exactly the same mistake as those who deny this. 
A good way of avoiding this mistake is by realizing that one can defend the idea that 
aggressors forfeit certain rights without embracing rights forfeiture theory. Christopher Heath 
Wellman gives the following characterization of rights forfeiture theory in the context of 
punishment (his characterization is, obviously, applicable to the context of self-defense too): 
“Defenders of the weak version do not deny that punishment is permissible only when it is 
necessary to advance some valuable aim; they merely emphasize that realizing these aims 
would not suffice to justify punishment if the person punished had not forfeited her right [but 
if she has, then realizing the aims in question does suffice to justify punishment]. The strong 
version alleges that, if the person being punished has forfeited her rights, it is permissible to 
                                                                                                                                                  
force against a lethal attack would be manslaughter. He does not explain why law is right in 
considering it manslaughter. Judith Jarvis Thomson once voiced similar concerns as Dressler, 
see her Rights, Restitution and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory ed. by W. Parent (London: 
University of Harvard Press), p. 34. See also George P. Fletcher, “Right to Life,” Georgia 
Law Review 13 (1979), pp. 1371-1394, section III. Rights forfeiture theories of punishment 
have suffered similar criticisms, see for example David Boonin’s sustained attack on 
forfeiture theory in The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), pp. 103-119. 
14 While some authors explicitly grant this, they do not draw the right conclusions from it. 
Kimberly Ferzan, for example, explicitly distinguishes permissibility from liability but 
nevertheless argues “that liability is its own interesting conceptual and normative path to 
permissibility, and the reason it is permissible to kill culpable aggressors is because they are 
liable to defensive force.” Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Provocateurs,” Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 7 (2013), pp. 597-622, at 606. Jeff McMahan, whom Ferzan credits with having 
introduced the distinction between permissibility and liability, succumbs to the same mistake 
as Ferzan, as his talk about “liability-based justifications” or a “liability justification” 
suggests. See Jeff McMahan, “The Conditions of Liability to Preventive Attack,” in Deen K. 
Chatterjee, The Ethics of Preventive War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
pp. 121-144, at 23-124, and idem, “Targeted Killing: Murder, Combat, or Law Enforcement,” 
in Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, and Andrew Altman, Targeted Killings: Law and 
Morality in an Asymmetrical World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 135-155, at 
138. For the record, it should be noted that said distinction is already there in Kant (see note 
41 below), although with a different terminology, and implicit, in my view, in a large part of 
traditional just war theory. It is also made quite explicitly by Joel Feinberg, Doing and 
Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 45, and by George P. Fletcher, 
“The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson,” UCLA Law Review 23 
(1975/76), pp. 293-321, at 320: “It might be just for a would-be murderer to be killed by his 
intended victim …, but it does not follow that the act of killing is justified.” 
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punish her for any purpose whatsoever” (for example for the purpose of satisfying one’s 
sadistic impulses).15 Pace Wellman, both the weak and the strong version of rights forfeiture 
theory are wrong. The strong version’s mistake lies in the remarkably swift transition from 
forfeiture to permissibility. When a person has forfeited a right, she now lacks it. However, a 
person’s mere lack of a right not to be killed provides by itself no justification to kill her. For 
example, a 500-year-old oak tree does not hold a right against me not to be cut down, but it is 
difficult to see how that, by itself, can possibly justify me in cutting it down.16 The same logic 
applies to persons: justified harming therefore requires more than the target’s liability to harm 
(even barring necessity prohibitions or other unusual circumstances that speak against 
harming the target). 
Moreover, that the harm is necessary to promote some valuable goal is still not sufficient, 
which undermines what Wellman calls the weak version of rights forfeiture theory. Consider 
the following example: Culpable Jill is about to murder innocent Bill, unbeknownst to greedy 
Gabi, who considers Jill to be an innocent person but shoots her out of selfish financial 
interests and, as it so happens, just in time to prevent her from murdering Bill (again, Gabi 
was not aware that she was thereby preventing Jill from murdering Bill). Let us further 
suppose that this shot, which injured Jill’s arm, was a proportionate (which of course it was) 
and necessary means “to advance some valuable aim,” namely innocent Bill’s aim to live on. 
Now, it seems that Jill has no valid complaint against Gabi: it is counter-intuitive to claim 
that Gabi owes the would-be-murderer Jill any compensation. However, the fact that Jill has 
no complaint against Gabi’s attack does not make this attack permissible.17 Gabi has 
                                                
15 Christopher Heath Wellman, “Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment,” Ethics 122(2), pp. 
371-393, at 375. Wellman himself subscribes to the strong version, see ibid. My addition in 
square brackets is a fair interpretation of Wellman, as one can see both from the preceding 
and the following sentence as well as from the thrust of Wellman’s entire argument. 
However, in a footnote (ibid., n. 7) Wellman adds a qualification to his account, noting that it 
is “a slight oversimplification.” Since he is not an absolutist about rights, he does not say that 
rights-forfeiture is absolutely necessary for justified punishment. Nor is it always sufficient, 
“since there may be other factors that ground obligations” (like Alison’s promise to Betty that 
she will not punish Carol even if Carol has forfeited her right not to be punished.) These 
extraordinary circumstances need not concern us further here (nor does Wellman further 
discuss them in his article). 
16 Perhaps some people might think that other persons have a right that I do not cut it down. 
However, even if all persons in the world waived such a supposed right, that still seems to be 
insufficient for providing me with a justification for cutting down such an old tree for the 
mere fun of it. 
17 I have encountered the objection that Jill would have a complaint against Gabi if Gabi 
tortured her to death for the fun of it. This objection, however, misses the mark. Gabi is 
shooting at Jill out of greed, and it is unclear how that is supposed to be better than shooting 
here for the fun of it; however, I nowhere claim that someone who commits a rights violation 
of a certain gravity thereby forfeits all rights; rather, my claim would be that she forfeits the 
right against unnecessary harm of equivalent severity. Thus, Gabi does not forfeit her right 
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committed a so-called impossible attempt (of battery, in this case). Since the objective 
circumstances for the justification of her act were satisfied (her act was a necessary and 
proportionate means to stop an unjust attack) she could, from a moral point of view,18 not 
really commit battery with her act – this was impossible – but, nevertheless, she did try and 
only failed because (unbeknownst to her) the objective justifying circumstances were given. 
That is, she did attempt to commit battery, and attempts to commit battery are not 
permissible. Therefore, in order to not let attempted batterers like Gabi (let alone attempted 
murderers) off the hook, Western self-defense law posits a subjective element for justified 
self- or other-defense: the defender must at least know or be aware of the fact that the 
conditions of justified self-defense are fulfilled, otherwise she commits an impermissible act 
for which she can be punished.19 This, however, seems also to be the correct view from the 
                                                                                                                                                  
against being unnecessarily tortured. I actually do think, however, that if someone tortures 
someone else to death for the mere fun of it then he, conversely, forfeits his right against 
being tortured to death for the mere fun of it himself. While some liberal philosophers might 
find this “barbaric” or counter-intuitive, it is my experience that most people find this just and 
fair. I share this assessment (see below) and I have nowhere encountered an argument that 
would show it to be wrong. 
18 Or, more precisely, she could not do this if we think that there cannot be a battery without a 
rights violation, as I think we should. Law, however, would in principle be free, of course, to 
categorize Gabi’s act as battery because it fits the description of the legal offense and one of 
the elements of the legal defense is missing. This would then, however, lead to the morally 
wrong results in civil court (allowing Jill to sue Gabi).  
19 In the German context (and German law is here typical for Continental European 
jurisdictions), see for example Volker Erb, “Notwehr,” in Wolfgang Joecks and Klaus 
Miebach (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, Vol. 1 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 
2003), pp. 1249-1337, at 1333. For an overview of the Anglo-Saxon debate on this issue, see 
Boaz Sangero, Self-Defense in Criminal Law (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006), 
pp. 231-236. On “impossible attempts,” see ibid., pp. 235-236. There are authors who reject 
the idea that there is a subjective element to the justifiability of self-defense (for example 
Paul H. Robinson, Judith Jarvis Thomson, and Phillip Montague). In my view, they all fail to 
offer a plausible way of dealing with the case of the impossible attempt. Robinson, 
“Competing Theories of Justification: Deeds v. Reasons,” in A. T. Simester and A. T. H. 
Smith (eds.), Harm and Culpability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 45-70, at 47-48 for 
example, rightly concedes that the impossible attempt should result in criminal liability, but it 
is mysterious how that squares with his supposedly purely objectivist theory of criminality. 
See on this point Andrew Botterell, “Why We Ought to be (Reasonable) Subjectivists about 
Justification,” Criminal Justice Ethics 26 (2007), pp. 36-58, at 55-56, n. 26; see there also for 
further references. For a recent criticism of pure objectivism in ethics, see T. M. Scanlon, 
Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, and Blame (Harvard: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press), pp. 47-52. It is beyond the scope of this article to deal with this issue in 
detail, but see the brief discussion below on “culpable right action.” For a more elaborate 
discussion, see Uwe Steinhoff, “Against the Purely Objectivist Interpretation of Moral 
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moral point of view: not only Gabi’s character, but Gabi’s act – attempted battery – deserves 
moral condemnation (and punishment).20 
Such a knowledge requirement seems to govern justified punishment no less than justified 
self-defense and therefore leads to exactly the same problem in the case of the rights 
forfeiture theory of punishment as it does in the case of the rights forfeiture theory of self-
defense. As Simmons puts it: “If the criminal simply forfeits his right not to be harmed in 
certain ways, then any way in which this harm is imposed appears morally acceptable, any 
reason a person has for imposing it is good enough. If Butch and his gang roam the state of 
nature, cutting throats at random just for the fun of it, and happen to cut the throat of a 
murderer (who deserves to be punished with a painful death, say), then that particular throat-
cutting, but no other, might be morally acceptable. This seems a preposterous implication of 
the position I have been defending.”21  
Of course, most rights forfeiture theorists, after making such confessions, then assure their 
readers that appearances are deceptive and deny that attackers or offenders like Jill are, in 
fact, liable to force or harms that are inflicted on them “for the wrong reasons.” The literature 
on punishment in particular is full of such denials by rights forfeiture theorists. Yet, I have to 
admit that in my view none of the arguments (or mere assertions) that have been adduced in 
support of such denials are even remotely plausible, and even at least some of those who 
adduce them seem to be aware of the fact that there is something “odd” or “awkward” about 
such denials.22 
Simmons tries to dissipate the impression of awkwardness by claiming that “we often 
voluntarily transfer to others rights to act only for certain reasons” and suggesting that it 
therefore “seems plausible to suppose that nonvoluntary forfeiture might result … in rights to 
harm another only for certain reasons.”23 However, this is a non-sequitur: the correctness of 
the first claim does not imply or even as much as suggest the plausibility of the second one. 
Simmons’ example of the voluntary rights transfer is giving a doctor certain rights for your 
                                                                                                                                                  
Obligation,” work in progress. 
20 See also Uwe Steinhoff, “Just Cause and ‘Right Intention,’” Journal of Military Ethics 
13(1) (2014), pp. 32-48, section II. 
21 A. John Simmons, “Locke and the Right to Punish,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 20(4) 
(1991), pp. 311-349, at 339. 
22 A. J. Simmons states about these denials: “These claims seem to me not unbearably 
awkward or ad hoc…” Yet, it would seem safe to assume that an author who found nothing 
awkward or ad hoc about an idea would feel no need to explicitly assert that he finds nothing 
“unbearably” awkward or ad hoc about it. At least he must be aware of the fact that others 
will find it awkward and ad hoc, and perhaps even unbearably so. See also Kimberly Kessler 
Ferzan, who admits that people “might find it odd” that someone is only liable to attacks that 
occur for the allegedly right reasons. See Simmons, “Locke and the Right to Punish,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 20(4) (1991), pp. 311-349, at 340; and Ferzan, “Culpable 
Aggression: The Basis for Moral Liability to Defensive Killing,” Ohio State Journal of 
Criminal Law 9 (2011-2012), pp. 669-697, at 695. 
23 Ibid., p. 340. 
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upcoming surgery. But that, of course, usually happens in writing; and other voluntary rights 
transfers usually also are quite explicit (or occur against a conventional background that 
makes clear what is transferred). Thus, indeed, if someone voluntarily gives a doctor the 
liberty to open his chest by explicitly saying “You may open my chest for medical reasons,” 
then it is entirely obvious that he has not given the doctor the liberty to open his chest for 
other reasons. In contrast, it is not obvious at all why someone who tries to murder someone 
else, that is, who tries to unnecessarily kill him, thereby only forfeits his rights against 
necessary harm. Rather, this is entirely mysterious, and Simmons’ explanations do nothing to 
solve this mystery. In short, the comparison between voluntary rights transfer and forfeiture 
is simply misleading here. 
Be that as it may, I will not further discuss attempts to stave off the implausible 
implications of rights-forfeiture theory. Rather, I would like to side-step the issue by voicing 
a suspicion and offering an alternative: my suspicion is that many of these denials and 
defenses are motivated by the concern that unless one can account for the limits that are 
intuitively imposed on justifiable punishment and self-defense in terms of rights-forfeiture 
itself, any appeal to rights-forfeiture becomes incredible. And this concern, in turn, is of 
course fueled by the mistaken acceptance of rights forfeiture theory. Once one rejects this 
theory, however, one can have the cake and eat it, as it were: one can subscribe to the 
intuitively quite plausible implications of rights-forfeiture (implications like the one that Jill 
in our example does not have a complaint against Gabi) without thereby incurring counter-
intuitive implications about permissibility (for instance that Gabi in our example acts 
justifiably). 
Again, the confusion between rights-forfeiture and permissibility is shared by both rights 
forfeiture theorists and critics of rights forfeiture (not only of rights forfeiture theory, but of 
rights forfeiture). This leads the critics of rights forfeiture into claiming victory too early, and 
it seduces supporters into trying to square the circle. Let me give two examples, one for each 
case. Wellman, a supporter, discusses a variant of the impossible attempt case.24 In this 
variant, the authorities frame a person for a theft he has never committed and imprison him. 
Unbeknownst to the authorities, however, the person had committed another theft and 
therefore was liable to exactly the time of imprisonment that the authorities imposed on him 
(for the wrong reasons). Wellman concedes, arguendo (and, in my view, quite rightly), that 
the so-called limited-reasons account of liability does not work:25 if people are liable to 
attack, they are liable to attack, irrespective of the reasons their attackers have to attack them. 
(We saw in our Jill, Bill, and Gabi example that Jill seems to be liable to Gabi’s attack – Gabi 
need not compensate her – although Gabi acts for the wrong reasons.) As a supporter of 
rights forfeiture theory, he therefore has to conclude that given that the framed person was 
liable to imprisonment by the authorities, those authorities imprisoned him permissibly.26 
                                                
24 Wellman, “Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment,” p. 380. 
25 The term “limited reasons account” is used by Kershnar, to whom Wellman refers. See 
Stephen Kershnar, Desert, Retribution, and Torture (Lanham: University of America Press, 
2001), pp. 133-135. Kershnar rightly rejects this account. 
26 One might claim here that the authorities still violated his right not to be framed. That 
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Wellman is aware of the fact that this is counter-intuitive. A further extremely unpalatable 
implication of this would be that one cannot punish the authorities for an attempt to “punish” 
a person for a crime that he has not committed. Wellman asserts that he, indeed, is “not sure 
that it would be permissible to punish the culpable authorities,”27 but he seems to realize that 
others will not be inclined to bite this bullet. Yet, his answer is that this problem could be 
overcome – so that one need not bite said bullet – by “simply construct[ing] actus reus so that 
it does not require the defendant to have violated someone else’s rights.”28 
This is what I meant by an attempt to square the circle: there seems to be no such thing as 
permissible actus reus. An actus reus seem to be impermissible by definition (although 
without mens rea it is excused), and since one cannot justifiably punish people for 
permissible actions,29 punishment cannot be justified here. Moreover, Wellman tries to 
defend this “construction” by musing: “If one can forfeit one’s rights against punishment 
without violating someone else’s right, for instance, then perhaps … the culpable authorities 
performed the requisite actus reus.”30 However, if one can commit an actus reus and thus an 
impermissible act without violating someone’s right, why should this then not also be true for 
punishment? Yet, if it is true, and given that forfeited rights cannot be violated, then Wellman 
contradicts his own endorsement of the strong rights forfeiture theory, that is, his claim that 
“if the person being punished has forfeited her rights, it is permissible to punish her for any 
purpose whatsoever.”31 Thus, it seems that defenders of rights forfeiture theory are prone to 
succumb to veritable moral and logical conundrums. 
It should be noted, however, that some authors believe in “culpable right action,” deem 
culpability sufficient for punishment, and thus conclude that people (even barring extreme 
circumstances) can justifiably be punished for permissible action and action that does not 
violate anybody’s rights.32 On this view, Gabi would have acted permissibly but culpably, 
and she could be punished for her culpable act. This move, if successful, could avoid some of 
the problems pointed out above, it seems. 
                                                                                                                                                  
might be true, but it is not the issue. The question is whether he had a right not to be punished 
for the wrong reasons. One can easily change the example by having him punished without 
being framed first. Moreover, note that the fact that the culprit’s legal rights were violated 
here is neither here nor there. On my view, the moral foundation for giving even culpable 
persons such legal rights is a precautionary rule whose moral rationale is the protection of 
the innocent (see below), but not necessarily a moral right. It is, however, precisely moral 
rights we are concerned with here. 
27 Wellman, “Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment,” p. 383. 
28 Ibid., p. 384. 
29 Extreme circumstances aside (the King kills innocents if you do not slightly punish 
someone for a permissible action). This proviso corresponds to Wellman’s own proviso with 
regard to rights forfeiture theory, see ibid, p. 375, n. 7.  
30 Ibid., pp. 383-384. 
31 Ibid., p. 375. 
32 See for instance also Heidi Hurd, Moral Combat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), p. 265. Wellman now seems to take this view too (personal communication). 
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Yet, this move seems to rely on an extremely idiosyncratic reinterpretation of ordinary 
moral terms, that is, it has little to do with how we normally use terms like “permissible” or 
“culpable.” To wit, if a proponent of this view is asked by someone: “I would like to go into a 
full theater and shoot randomly at the guests, is that permissible?”, then on pain of 
inconsistency the proponent would have to answer: “Well, that depends on who you will hit. 
If you hit people like Jill, it’s fine, otherwise not.” Likewise, if a person asks: “Look, I would 
like to become a primary school teacher, but I believe I would then sexually abuse some of 
the children – do you think it is permissible for me to take the job anyway?”, then this person 
would have to be informed by the pure objectivist: “It will have been permissible if you do 
not actually abuse them; if, however, you do abuse them, then it will have been 
impermissible.” These answers, however, would certainly not be given by ordinary speakers. 
They are also unhelpful. After all, what we expect from morality is action-guidance, and thus 
morality has to take into account, as Thomas Scanlon points out, “the fact that we are 
commonly dealing with imperfect information.”33 That is, morality should be able to advise 
human beings as to how they should act under conditions of imperfect information – the only 
conditions human beings will ever encounter. It should not just tell people what they should 
do if certain facts are given, but it should also advise them on how to deal with situations 
where the agents do not know which conditions are given.34 One good piece of advice, one 
that reduces harm done to innocent others, is to be considerate, circumspect and cautious – 
but this advice also refers to states of mind. 
A second problem of the view under consideration is that it is not clear what the 
objectivist means with “culpability.” In particular, it is difficult to see how this could be 
moral culpability. Normally we say that someone is culpable if he knowingly or at least 
negligently did something impermissible (and does not have an excuse). The objectivist 
cannot say that (on his account Gabi’s act is not impermissible). So why is Gabi culpable? 
Maybe the objectivist will say that she is culpable because she recklessly took the risk of 
killing an innocent person. But why does that make her culpable on the objectivist account? 
After all, morality does not require her not to be reckless in this way on the objectivist 
account: if it did, then her reckless act would be impermissible (since it contravenes a 
requirement of morality), which, however, is precisely what the objectivist denies. To put it 
differently: if morality required people not to act culpably, then Gabi’s act would be 
impermissible. If however, as the objectivist claims, morality does not require people not to 
act culpably – on what basis can the objectivist claim that Gabi is “morally culpable”? What 
does this even mean then? The objectivist does not really explain this.  
Finally, the objectivist realizes that there is something morally problematic about Gabi’s 
act. Since her act, on the objectivist’s account, is not impermissible, he explains this with her 
“culpability” (whatever that means in the objectivist’s language). Yet, imagine Gabi had 
randomly shot at theatergoers (and thereby hit Jill and stopped the murder of Bill) because 
she reasonably but mistakenly believed that otherwise a nuclear bomb would detonate in the 
                                                
33 Scanlon, Moral Dimensions, p. 50. 
34 See on this point also Michael J. Zimmerman, “Is Moral Obligation Objective or 
Subjective,” Utilitas 18(4) (2006), pp. 329-361. 
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city, killing everyone in it, including the theatergoers. In my view, if her reasonable belief 
had been correct, then she would have acted justifiably – she would have had a necessity 
justification for her course of action. Yet, her belief was not correct. Thus, ordinary speakers 
would say that she acted impermissibly, but excusably. She is excused because her belief was 
reasonable and she acted because she wanted to save human life. The objectivist, however, 
cannot say that she acted impermissibly, and now it seems that even the escape route of at 
least saying that she acted culpably is blocked. In other words, the objectivist would have to 
say now that there was nothing wrong with Gabi’s act – it was neither impermissible nor 
culpable and thus morally unproblematic. However, this seems to be absurd and hence 
undermines the objectivist position. 
Thus, it seems that the purely objectivist account of moral permissibility is too implausible 
to offer a valid escape route out of the moral and logical conundrums that rights-forfeiture 
theory is faced with. As I said, the source of these conundrums is the mistake of taking rights-
forfeiture to imply permissibility (at least under “normal” conditions). And as I also said, this 
mistake is no less widespread among critics of rights forfeiture than among its defenders. 
One such critic is David Boonin. He states that “the central point of the forfeiture-based 
retributivist position is that serving a useful purpose is not enough to make it permissible to 
punish an offender in the first place were it not for the fact that he had forfeited some of his 
previous rights by committing the offense for which he is to be punished.”35 Thus, he clearly 
sees here that forfeiture-based retributivists can distinguish between permission and rights-
forfeiture: the latter does not yet imply the former. Yet, when criticizing this position he 
himself seems to confuse permission and rights-forfeiture constantly. He states that the 
“forfeiture claim … entails that a rapist forfeits the right not to be raped and a torturer forfeits 
the right not to be tortured.”36 But why should this amount to an argument against the 
position in question? Because, says Boonin, it “is difficult to believe that these people have 
lost these rights: that it would be morally permissible for the state to torture the torturer, … 
unfairly sentence the unfair judge, and so on.”37 However, I suspect that it is only then 
difficult to believe that a (culpable and unjust) torturer has forfeited his right not to be 
tortured if one assumes (as Boonin clearly does here) that this would then make torturing him 
permissible.38 However, there is no good reason to make such an assumption. To speak for 
myself, while I do agree that the state – perhaps extremely rare exceptions aside – cannot 
justifiably torture a person, not even a serial sadist torturer of high school girls, I also think 
that such a serial sadist torturer has forfeited his right not to be tortured (I will come back to 
                                                
35 Boonin, The Problem of Punishment, pp. 105-106. 
36 Ibid., p. 110. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Boonin makes this unwarranted assumption not only in the passage just quoted but also 
when expounding two other arguments against retributivists (ibid., pp. 114 and 116). Of 
course, he has additional arguments (which I also find unconvincing), but I cannot and need 
not discuss them here. I am only concerned here with the fact that at least three of his 
arguments against retributivism seem to rely on a conflation of rights-forfeiture and 
permissibility. 
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this in the next section). If he insists on this alleged right of his, a valid reply seems to be: 
look who’s talking. He is simply not in a position to complain, given what he himself did to 
others. (It should be noted that Boonin provides no positive argument demonstrating that the 
culpable torturer indeed does keep his right not to be tortured. Incidentally, the fact that many 
people who argue against the justifiability of capital punishment do not do so on the grounds 
that the death penalty would violate a culpable serial murderer’s rights, but rather on the 
grounds that often, due to judicial errors, innocent people are executed, should have alerted 
Boonin to the significant practical importance of the distinction between rights forfeiture and 
justification.) 
Thus, in my view, the best way to take the wind out of the sail of critics of rights forfeiture 
is not by trying to argue (mostly unconvincingly and rather desperately, in my view) that 
rights forfeiture theory can account for the usual limits imposed on self-defense and 
punishment (and allegedly can avoid a host of unattractive implications) but, instead, by 
arguing that rights forfeiture theory is simply wrong. In the following section 2, I will 
advance this argument by focusing on necessity. If rights forfeiture theory is wrong, authors 
who endorse the view that attackers and offenders forfeit certain rights need not account for 
the limits imposed on self-defense and punishment in terms of rights-forfeiture alone, or, 
indeed, even rights alone. They also need not be concerned about counter-intuitive 
implications of rights forfeiture theory. There are alternatives. I will sketch such alternatives 
in sections 3.1-3.3 in the context of self-defense. Parallel arguments apply to the case of 
punishment.39 
 
2. Against Rights-Forfeiture Theory: Forfeiture without Necessity and Instrumentality 
Suppose Frank unjustly tries to kill you simply because he does not like your nose. You can 
as easily stop him by using your taser as by shooting him in the chest with your revolver. You 
shoot him in the chest. On my view, this is unjustified (and I will later explain why.) 
However, have you wronged him, that is, can the aggressor justly complain? Did you violate 
his rights? I think one can reasonably deny that. After all, if the aggressor says (dying), “You 
used lethal self-defense although you could have used less drastic means,” the understandable 
and quite appropriate reply would be: “Look who’s talking.”40 It seems that by culpably and 
unnecessarily trying to kill you the attacker has forfeited his right against you that you not kill 
him unnecessarily.41 
                                                
39 Of course, on a retributivist account of punishment, there is no necessity condition for 
punishment (on some other accounts there is). I will not go into the limiting conditions of 
punishment here, since it seems to me to be fairly obvious how the arguments applied here 
primarily in the context of self-defense can be applied to the context of punishment too. 
40 Cf. Helen Frowe, “Jeff McMahan, Killing In War” (book review), Journal of Moral 
Philosophy 10 (2013), pp. 112-115, esp. at 112-113.  
41 This is also the view of a number of other authors. As Joachim Hruschka (2003), “Die 
Notwehr im Zusammenhang von Kants Rechtslehre,” Zeitschrift für die Gesamte 
Strafrechtswissenschaft 115(2), pp. 201-23, at 213, points out with regard to Kant’s position 
on the necessity or (in Kant’s words) moderation requirement in self-defense situations: “This 
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Many, no doubt, will find this view unpalatable – but many others (no doubt here as well) 
will find the view unpalatable that Frank indeed does have a valid complaint against his 
                                                                                                                                                  
is the reason why, as the ‘Metaphysics of Morals’ states, ‘a recommendation to show 
moderation (moderamen) belongs not to right but only to ethics.” See Immanuel Kant (1996), 
The Metaphysics of Morals (trans. and ed. by Mary Gregor) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1996), p. 28. As regards Locke, see his Two Treatises of 
Government, ed. by Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2002), esp. pp. 
273-274 (§11), 278-280 (§§ 17-18), and 282-283 (§172). Compare also Simmons’ 
interpretation of Locke, see “Locke and the Right to Punish,” p. 331. Seumas Miller, in 
“Killing in Self-Defense,” Public Affairs Quarterly 7(4) (1993), pp. 325-339, esp. at 332-338 
likewise argues that killing a lethal aggressor to save one’s own life (or other sufficiently 
valuable goods) need not be necessary for the aggressor to forfeit his life. Stephen Kershnar 
agrees, see Desert, Retribution, and Torture, pp. 133-135. Helen Frowe has recently made the 
same point, see Frowe, “Self-Defence and the Principle of Non-Combatant Immunity,” 
Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2011), pp. 530-546, at 545, n. 31; and Defensive Killing 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), ch. 4. Unlike Miller (see note 53 for Miller’s 
account), however, Frowe does not really make a credible effort to explain where the 
necessity condition of justifiable self-defense comes from. She merely claims – without 
argument – that it “must be grounded in a more general moral requirement not to cause 
unnecessary harm to people and other sentient beings” and affirms that she takes “the 
existence of such a requirement to be relatively uncontroversial.” Ibid., p. 117. If, however, it 
really were uncontroversial, one would think that the requirements not to engage in boxing 
matches or not to kill animals for other than defensive purposes would also be 
uncontroversial – but in fact most people deem both practices permissible. One might reply 
that boxing matches and non-defensive killings of animals are necessary for something, for 
example for a certain kind of entertainment or the satisfaction of certain desires. But that, of 
course, is also the case in my example of the unnecessary killing of an aggressor, and thus 
Frowe’s “more general requirement” does not impose much of a restraint and is unable to 
explain the more specific necessity requirement of the self-defense justification. David 
Rodin, too, admits that “many rights are implicitly reciprocal” and that “on a plausible 
understanding of rights, one only has the right to life so long as one respects the right to life 
of others.” See his “The Problem with Prevention,” in Henry Shue and David Rodin, 
Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), pp. 143-170, at 165. However, he does not draw the logical conclusion from this 
insight. Instead, like Ferzan and Simmons, he insists that there “is nothing incoherent or 
peculiar” in binding an aggressor’s liability to the defender’s awareness that he is being 
confronted with an aggressor or to “material facts about the defender” and thus to necessity. 
This latter claim contradicts the reciprocity claim. See for the quotes David Rodin, War and 
Self-Defense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), p. 76. Rodin has meanwhile further elaborated 
his thoughts on reciprocity in “The Reciprocity Theory of Rights,” Law and Philosophy 33 
(2014), pp. 281–308. Again, he seems not to be aware of the fact that this reciprocity theory 
contradicts his views on liability. 
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would-be victim. To be sure, I do not presume here to have a knock-down argument for rights 
forfeiture not being connected to necessity; however, the other side does not have a knock-
down argument against this position either. McMahan, for example, claims: “If harming a 
person is unnecessary for the achievement of a relevant type of goal, that person cannot be 
liable to be harmed.”42 But why? On the previous page, McMahan explains that “a person is 
liable to be harmed only if harming him will serve some further purpose.”43 However, first, 
that is a mere stipulation that I see no reason to accept. Second, even if this stipulation were 
correct, McMahan still commits a non-sequitur. After all, that a person is liable to the 
infliction of a certain defensive harm only if the infliction of that harm is instrumental does 
not imply that the infliction of the harm must be necessary. Shooting Frank in the chest is 
instrumental and does achieve the defensive goal, but it still is not necessary. 
Meanwhile McMahan actually admits that he has “no decisive response to this challenge,” 
that is, to the claim that constraints like necessity or proportionality are not internal to 
liability or rights-forfeiture. He states, however, that his “main reason for treating them as 
internal constraints on liability is that this makes liability essentially instrumental.”44 Yet, as 
we already saw, first, it is unclear why this should be an advantage,45 and second, it would 
still not suffice to show that Frank is not liable to be shot in the chest. 
Moreover, even if one granted such a right against unnecessary attack, its scope and 
strength is still open to debate, and a rights-forfeiture account seems by its own logic to be 
driven to making this right rather narrow and weak, so narrow and weak, in fact, that it does 
not suffice to uphold the usual restrictions on permissible self-defense. 
Ferzan is a illustrative case in point: she has an enormously permissive account of the 
necessity condition. She claims that once the defender is actually facing an imminent attack, 
“the appropriate viewpoint [to assess the satisfaction of the necessity condition] is the self-
defender’s,” and she explicitly “eschew[s] the need for any evaluative criteria. The defender’s 
                                                
42 Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), p. 9. 
43 Ibid., p. 8. 
44 Jeff McMahan, “Proportionality and Just Cause: A Comment on Kamm,” Journal of Moral 
Philosophy 11 (2014), pp. 428-453, at 434.  
45 However, McMahan thinks that this instrumental account makes it easer to distinguish 
liability from desert. Frowe, Defensive Killing, pp. 105-106, while denying that the necessity 
condition is internal to justified self-defense, nevertheless agrees with McMahan that one can 
only be liable to defensive harms that can avert a threat and also claims that purely 
backwards-looking accounts (like mine) have difficulties distinguishing between liability and 
desert. Yet, it is quite easy to distinguish the two without an instrumental account. If someone 
deserves to be attacked, this implies that there is a (defeasible) reason to attack him. If 
someone is liable to an attack, however, this merely implies that he would not be wronged by 
this attack – it does not provide a reason to attack him. “Backwards-looking accounts” can 
make this distinction as easily as instrumentalists. Moreover, harms can be defensive without 
being able to avert a threat. It is sufficient that they resist an attack. See on this Uwe 
Steinhoff, “What is Self-Defense?”, Public Affairs Quarterly, forthcoming. 
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subjective belief in any probability is sufficient, and this belief need not be reasonable.”46 
However, since the necessity criterion is a criterion that limits the choice of means, it would 
appear that Ferzan’s account implies that a heavyweight prize boxer who has the inane belief 
that he can stop a tiny 18-year-old girl who is trying to strangle him only by shooting her in 
the head would not violate the necessity condition by indeed shooting her in the head. But 
this implication seems absurd. A necessity criterion that is that permissive can hardly 
function as a limiting condition anymore,47 but even Ferzan is well aware of the fact that the 
necessity criterion is indeed supposed to be a restriction on the permissibility of self-
defense.48 
Ferzan’s response will be, of course, that “the perception of this risk has been culpably 
caused by the [aggressor]. Thus, he cannot stand to complain that [the defender] has acted on 
the very perception that he [the aggressor] has created.”49 She is absolutely right. (Of course, 
she does not explain why the aggressor does stand to complain if the defender kills a lethal 
aggressor knowing that this is unnecessary, that is, she does not explain why there should be a 
necessity condition at all. But again, no forfeiture theorist really explains this.) Yet, as far as 
the permissibility of self-defense is concerned, her response presupposes that only those 
limitations on self-defense are warranted the absence of which would give the aggressor 
cause for complaint. However, as already noted, there is no good reason for making such an 
assumption, and once one drops it and realizes that the source of the necessity criterion need 
not lie in the rights of the aggressor (alone), the path is cleared for a more restrictive – and 
more reasonable – rendering of the necessity condition. 
Thus, it seems that an account of self-defense that distinguishes liability from justification 
– not only analytically, but for practical purposes and under normal circumstances – leads to 
far more plausible and intuitive results. German law, for instance, holds that if a defender out 
of fear and confusion (as opposed to vengefulness, for example) reacts with excessive force 
to an unjust attack, then this excessive force, being excessive, is not justified, but the 
defender normally does not owe the aggressor any compensation.50 Thus, German law 
acknowledges the intuition that seems to underlie Ferzan’s account: since it was the 
aggressor’s aggression that evoked the fear and confusion of the defender, a fear and 
                                                
46 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defense,” Law and Philosophy 24(6) (2005), pp. 
711-749, at 739. 
47 Daniel Statman also complains that Ferzan’s account “seems to make the necessity 
condition mute as a constraint on self-defense.” See his “Can Wars Be Fought Justly? The 
Necessity Condition Put to the Test,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2011), pp. 435-51, at 
444.  
48 Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defense,” p. 730. 
49 Ferzan, “Culpable Aggression,” p. 691. I substituted the first “[aggressor]” for Ferzan’s 
actual “defender” since the latter is clearly a slip of the pen on Ferzan’s part. Compare also 
“Justifying Self-Defense,” p. 740. 
50 Günter Spendel, “Überschreitung der Notwehr,” in Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Wolfgang 
Ruß, and Günther Willms (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch, Leizpziger Kommentar, Großkommentar, 
Bd. 2, §§ 32-60 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1985), §33, Rn. 77-82. 
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confusion for which the defender cannot be blamed (while he could be blamed for 
vengefulness), the aggressor does not stand to complain. However, German law does not then 
take the implausible further step of relaxing the necessity condition to such a degree that it 
can hardly function as a restraint on justified self-defense anymore. Thus, it seems that 
keeping justification and liability apart pays off in terms of plausibility. 
 
3. An Alternative to Rights-Forfeiture Theory: The Precautionary Rule Account 
 
3. 1 Necessity 
What might the source of the necessity condition then be, if it does not stem from the rights 
of culpable aggressors? Well, instead of being (only) about the rights of guilty people such as 
culpable aggressors, its (additional) underlying rationale might be about the protection of 
innocent people. There is, after all, obviously the risk that you misinterpret the situation and 
the allegedly culpable lethal aggressor is not culpable at all, but innocent (maybe he had a 
psychotic break due to drugs a villain slipped into his drink). Abiding by the necessity 
criterion reduces the risk that innocent people get unnecessarily killed.51 In other words, what 
the necessity condition tells you in the original Frank case, as far as justification is concerned, 
                                                
51 Note that I am not here concerned with the harming of bystanders or with what McMahan 
calls “wide proportionality.” The self-defense justification justifies force used against 
attackers (morally innocent or not); the force used against bystanders (even if it emanates, as 
a side-effect, from a defensive act against an attacker), however, would have to be covered by 
a choice of evils or necessity justification. See Boaz Sangero, Self-Defense in Criminal Law 
(Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006), pp. 117-121; see also Victor Tadros, The Ends 
of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
pp. 179-181. McMahan, (incorrectly) once subsumed the “collateral” killing of innocent 
civilians under the self-defense justification, but he nevertheless distinguished the 
proportionality of this “collateral killing” from the proportionality of the force used against 
the unjust combatants, using the terms “wide proportionality” and “narrow proportionality,” 
respectively. See Killing in War, pp. 20-32. Meanwhile, however, he connects wide 
proportionality with a lesser evil justification, narrow proportionality with a “liability 
justification,” and allows the self-defense justification to be a “combined” lesser-evil and 
liability justification. See McMahan, “Proportionality and Just Cause,” esp. pp. 438-442. 
McMahan’s conceptual innovations are not helpful. There is no need to talk about “wide” or 
“narrow” proportionality. There are simply different kinds of justifications, and they come 
with different standards of proportionality, as is well known in the legal literature. Moreover, 
the self-defense justification in law – and this it also how I understand this justification for 
moral purposes – is what McMahan calls a “liability justification”; it is not a “combined” 
justification. Acts that are justified by the self-defense justification are not only justified as 
the lesser evil, but just – they do not wrong the attacker. Thus, questions of “wide 
proportionality” (or of “wide necessity,” for that matter) are simply beyond its scope. 
Compare also Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 
155, n. 38. 
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might not be: “No, please, don’t kill Frank, because if a vicious would-be murderer is killed 
without defensive need, then he suffers a terrible wrong by getting what he wanted to dish out 
to others” – it might not tell you this partly because many people will not find it particularly 
convincing. Rather, it may be read as: “No, please, don’t kill Frank unnecessarily because 
you might not have the whole picture and because of this you might accidentally and 
needlessly kill an innocent person.” Thus, while the necessity condition of the justification of 
self-defense does as a matter of fact also protect liable, guilty people like Frank, its 
underlying ethical rationale is the protection of innocent people.52  
And innocent aggressors can stand to complain if they are unnecessarily harmed, and thus 
they do retain their rights against unnecessary harm. “Look who’s talking” is not an equally 
apt reply to both Frank and an innocent aggressor. Whether people are responsible actors or 
not obviously matters a great deal for moral questions. This is also shown in the fact that the 
innocent aggressor could justly respond: “What do you mean, ‘Look who’s talking’? You 
reproach me with not doing to others as I would have them do to me? But you are wrong. If I 
had been of sound mind and you had attacked me under the influence of drugs, I would not 
have used unnecessary force to stop you.” Provided this is the honest truth – and of course it 
can be – this is a valid rejoinder. This rejoinder, however, is not available to Frank. He was of 
sound mind (in the sense that he was a responsible actor) and nevertheless did use 
unnecessary force even without anybody attacking him. Thus, if he were to claim that he 
wouldn’t have used unnecessary force against you if you had tried to kill him, then this would 
be an obvious lie. 
Abiding by the rule not to harm aggressors unnecessarily will reduce the likelihood that 
the defender unnecessarily harms innocent people and thereby violates their rights. Insofar as 
morality requires agents not to impose unfair and unreasonable risks on others, it requires 
defenders to abide by the necessity requirement. This requirement is thus indirectly based on 
rights (though not of aggressors but of innocent people), but violating it is not the same as 
violating a right. The rationale is also not an overall “rights-utilitarianism” that tries to reduce 
overall rights-violations: rather the rationale is an agent-relative requirement to take 
reasonable and fair precautions to reduce one’s own likelihood of violating other people’s 
rights. Thus, the necessity requirement is (at least also) a precautionary rule.53 
                                                
52 Robert F. Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp. 83-87, relies on the idea of an “error preference” to justify the 
proportionality requirement in law – while he does not explicitly state it, the idea here is of 
course that one should try one’s best to avoid errors that victimize innocent people. He does 
not apply this idea, though, to the necessity requirement (neither in law nor in morality). 
53 While, as I pointed out, a number of authors who embrace rights forfeiture claim that one 
can also forfeit one’s rights against unnecessary self-defense, the only author amongst them 
(to the best of my knowledge) who actually tries to provide an explanation for why there is a 
necessity requirement for morally justified self-defense anyway is Miller, “Killing in Self-
Defense.” He explains that “there is the obligation not to destroy what has value, and the life 
of the attacker still has, or may well have, value. And there is the related obligation to be 
merciful to those who have wronged you. Other obligations involve considerations that are 
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One might be tempted to object against this rationale of the necessity condition that surely 
sometimes one can be fairly certain that one is indeed dealing with a culpable aggressor – and 
why not use unnecessary force in such a case? But the answer to this question remains the 
same: because even if one can be fairly certain, one cannot be absolutely certain. Absolute 
certainty is unattainable for human beings (at the very least with regard to empirical matters). 
Thus, even if one is “fairly” certain that one is dealing with a culpable aggressor – by using 
unnecessary force one would still run the risk of inflicting unnecessary harm on an innocent 
person.  
But can one not sometimes be permitted to run this risk? Yes, one can, but not for the 
mere fun of it. Rather, one needs a very good reason to do so, one needs a justification for 
running this risk. Note that the justification cannot lie in self-defense itself. The necessity 
criterion adopted here is one that requires the use of the mildest means among the most 
effective ones, that is, it does not ask the defender to shoulder additional risks for the benefit 
of a culpable attacker (and a defender can justifiably believe herself to be confronted with a 
culpable attacker without having to be certain).54 Thus, given the necessity criterion adopted 
                                                                                                                                                  
external to the attacker. For example, there may be dire consequences for the community if 
defenders generally kill their attackers. Hence the existence of laws to the effect that one 
must not kill in self-defence unless one has to.” (Ibid., p. 333) However, first, the obligation 
(which is often easily overridable, anyway, for example if the destruction of what has value 
serves to create even more value) stands at best in the way of the unnecessary destruction 
(killing) of a culpable aggressor, but not in the way of other unnecessary ways of making him 
suffer (and one can make another person suffer without diminishing the person’s value); 
second, I do not see any particular reason to assume an “obligation to be merciful” towards a 
culpable would-be rapist or murderer; third, there are also often dire consequences for the 
families of people who are laid off, but that does not yet make laying them off unjustified 
(and, of course laying off X – or killing him – might have very good consequences for the 
family of another person, who now gets the job), moreover, sometimes families might be 
significantly better off if their domestic tyrant does not return home; and fourth, in a society 
where everyone has an organ donor card, where many people need donor organs, and which 
has the technological means to usefully harvest the organs of practically everyone who gets 
killed, a principle prohibiting the unnecessary killing of lethal attackers would have dire 
consequences for society, but it seems that it intuitively would still be valid: namely as an 
agent-relative requirement to take precautions, especially when engaging in dangerous 
behavior, against unnecessarily harming innocent people – the point is not a consequentialist 
and agent-neutral concern about “dire consequences for the community” or minimizing 
overall harm, but a concern about minimizing the harm oneself (hence “agent-relative”) will 
unnecessarily inflict on innocents. Be all this as it may, my explanation of the necessity 
requirement is compatible with Miller’s, and more important than the differences between 
our accounts is the presence of alternatives to accounts that conceive the necessity 
requirement as intrinsic to rights forfeiture.  
54 This version of the necessity criterion basically follows German law. See Erb, “Notwehr,” 
p. 1296. I defend this criterion at length from a moral perspective in “Self-Defense and the 
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here, it is an analytical truth (like “Circles are round”) that using unnecessary force will not 
improve on the defense as compared to the use of necessary force. 
So what other justifications could there be? Punishment would be one possibility. If the 
defender has sufficiently strong reasons to believe that a culpable aggressor would get away 
without receiving proportionate punishment if he does not inflict this punishment on the 
aggressor right now, then this might provide a justification to inflict harms on him that are 
not necessary by the standards of the self-defense justification.55 Another possible 
justification would be the so-called justifying emergency justification. For example, if the 
defender has sufficiently strong reasons to believe that the attacker would, after the defender 
has stopped his attack with necessary force, quickly recover and kill another innocent person, 
without anybody able to intervene and stop him, then this could provide what German law 
calls a justifying defensive emergency justification to kill or otherwise incapacitate him with 
an amount of force that was not necessary by the standards of self-defense.56 
In other words, the fact that there can be extreme cases where one may inflict more force 
on an aggressor than was necessary according to the standards of the self-defense justification 
does not show that these standards are not valid. It rather shows that in extreme cases there 
might be another justification available, a justification to override the limits set by the self-
defense justification. (Speed limits, for instance, are no less valid for the fact that under 
special circumstances – for example when one needs to rush someone to the hospital – they 
may be justifiably infringed on the basis of a necessity justification.) 
Thus, conceiving of the necessity requirement of the self-defense justification as a 
precautionary rule for the protection of the innocent makes good sense. However, in 
protecting the innocent certain trade-offs have to be made, which is why I mentioned fairness 
                                                                                                                                                  
Necessity Condition,” unpublished ms. 
55 Some might be tempted to object that private punishment (at least in the form of severe 
punishment of adults) or “vigilantism” can “never” be justified. However, this absolutist 
position, like many absolutist positions, is deeply implausible. For a criticism of absolutism, 
see Uwe Steinhoff, On the Ethics of Torture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2013), pp. 149-150. For defenses of some forms of private punishment and “vigilantism,” see 
Travis Dumsday, “On Cheering Charles Bronson: The Ethics of Vigilantism,” The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy 47 (2009), pp. 49-67; Kelly D. Hine, “Vigilantism Revisited: An 
Economic Analysis of the Law of Extra-Judicial Self-Help or Why Can’t Dick Shoot Henry 
for Stealing Jane’s Truck,” The American University Law Review 47 (1998), pp. 1221-1253, 
esp. 1252-1253 (there the author argues for a “justified vigilantism defense”); Elizabeth 
Ayyildiz, “When Battered Woman’s Syndrome Does Not Go Far Enough: The Battered 
Woman as Vigilante,” The American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the 
Law 4(1) (1995), pp. 141-166; Uwe Steinhoff, “Does the State have an Exclusive Right to 
Punish?”, unpublished ms. 
56 The German self-defense justification only applies to defense against imminent or ongoing 
attacks. The justifying defensive emergency justification deals with threats that do not come 
in the form of ongoing or imminent attacks. The restrictions of the latter justification are 
more stringent than the restrictions of the former. 
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and reasonability. After all, the defender or the people he or she defends are ex hypothesi also 
innocent, and therefore there must be limits to the concessions one makes to avoid harming 
innocent people by one’s actions. In addition, reciprocity considerations can also play a role. 
Suppose you live in a village where due to something in the water people quite regularly and 
innocently suffer from psychotic episodes and start insulting and even attacking other 
persons. You have so far always used only necessary defensive force, but after seeing again 
and again that all others are less scrupulous and obtaining proof that they also act towards 
you with excessive force during your psychotic episodes, you decide to adapt to their 
standards. It seems that this is justifiable. 
 
3.2 Proportionality 
Let us turn to proportionality. It is certainly not unreasonable to assume that some insults are 
so grave and disgusting that people who culpably offend innocent persons with them become 
liable to violent counter-measures, for example a punch on the nose.57 If this happens to 
them, they cannot complain. They might, however, be able to complain if someone cuts out 
their tongue to stop their insults. Thus, while, as I argued above, the necessity requirement is 
not intrinsic to rights-forfeiture in the case of a fully culpable aggressor (but is in the case of 
an innocent aggressor), it would appear that a proportionality requirement is intrinsic to 
rights-forfeiture even in the case of a culpable aggressor.58 
However, some jurisdictions, at least in the past, had no official proportionality 
requirement. German law in the Weimar republic, for instance, deemed it permissible to 
shoot at (and possibly kill) an apple thief if the defender (of the property) had no other means 
of stopping the thief.59 A German legal adage applied to self-defense holds that “Right need 
not yield to wrong.”60 Some might find this “barbaric,” but calling it barbaric is not really an 
argument and certainly does not show that the German position is mistaken. As Robert 
Schopp, for instance, nicely shows, if one gives a sufficiently fleshed out example where a 
culpable apple thief turns into a very culpable, indeed absolutely disgusting and despicable 
apple thief, our intuition that lethal force against him would wrong him is severely 
                                                
57 According to German law, self-defense can be directed against all kinds of ongoing or 
imminent rights-violations, not only against rights-violations that come in the form of the use 
of force. This also seems to be the morally correct stance to take. 
58 Again, the McMahanian category of “wide proportionality” is of no concern here. See note 
51 above. 
59 Rafael van Rienen, Die “sozialethischen” Einschränkungen des Notwehrrechts: Die 
Grenzen privater Rechtsverteidigung und das staatliche Gewaltmonopol (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2009), pp. 181-182.  
60 What is meant by this is that Right need not yield to Wrong for the benefit of the aggressor 
(it might have to yield for the benefit of innocent and non-threatening persons). As mentioned 
before, the self-defense justification is concerned with the infliction of harms on the 
aggressor. Harms inflicted on bystanders are dealt with by the German justifying emergency 
justification, that is, by a necessity justification. See note 51. 
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weakened.61 
But, again, luckily there is no reason to assume that the only source for a proportionality 
limitation on self-defense are the rights of the culpable aggressor, and this is what provides us 
with an argument against the Weimar position: the precaution-rationale of the previous 
section can be straightforwardly applied to the proportionality condition.62 After all, even if 
punching someone to stop his insults would not, given the nature of the insults and the 
culpability of the offender, violate his rights, it is reasonable to assume that the risks of 
misunderstandings, rights-violating escalations and over-reactions, and of hitting an innocent 
person (remember the village) are so great that, from the perspective of justification, far 
stricter proportionality restrictions should be imposed than the perspective of liability or 
rights-forfeiture calls for.63 
 
3.3. The Subjective Element of Self-Defense and Reasonability 
The reader will recall the Jill/Bill/Gabi case from above. I stated that in order to not let 
attempted batterers like Gabi (let alone attempted murderers) off the hook, Western self-
defense law posits a subjective element for justified self- or other-defense: the defender must 
at least know or be aware of the fact that the objective conditions of justified self-defense are 
fulfilled, or he must even reasonably believe it (I subscribe to this latter version). I also stated 
that rights forfeiture theorists have extreme difficulties in explaining this requirement: it 
seems counter-intuitive that aggressors like Jill only “forfeit their claims about actions that 
are responsive to their attacks.”64 It appears that Jill simply has no standing to complain to 
Gabi. (Right-forfeiture theories of punishment face parallel problems.) 
                                                
61 Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions, pp. 83-84. 
62 Schopp does this in the context of law. He argues that a defender has “no obligation to 
observe rules of proportion or retreat against the culpable aggressor” (ibid., p. 83), that is, he 
does not owe it to the aggressor to abide by such a rule. Yet, Schopp states: “The rough rule 
of proportion represented by the dominant contemporary approach to the justified use of 
defensive force can be understood as an attempt to guide these decisions according to the 
moral principles presented here with adjustments for practical limitations and defensible error 
preferences.” (Ibid., p. 85) Such error preferences thus give rise to what I call precautionary 
rules. Schopp applies this rationale only to proportionality in the legal context (and 
interestingly does not apply it to the necessity condition at all), but I see no reason why 
morality should not also express error preferences and accordingly guide people with 
precautionary rules. Note, incidentally, that (unlike Schopp, it seems [see ibid, pp. 83-84]) I 
am willing to also recognize a proportionality requirement that has to do with the rights of an 
aggressor, see the main text. I do agree with him, however, that the stringency of such 
requirements is often severely exaggerated. 
63 Thus, it is wrong to claim, as David Rodin in “Justifying Harm,” Ethics 122(1) (2011), pp. 
74-110, at 79, does, that “a person can only be liable to a particular harm that is proportionate 
in the circumstances.” A harm can be disproportionate all things (that is, both liability and 
justification) considered although the targeted person is liable to it. 
64 Ferzan, “Culpable Aggression,” p. 696. 
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Yet, again, fortunately the subjective element of the self-defense justification can be 
explained without an appeal to the rights of culpable offenders, let alone to a supposed right 
of culpable offenders not to be harmed “for the wrong reasons.” Consider the following 
example: Robert, a superb marksman, who always wanted to randomly kill a person in a 
theater, goes into a theater, draws his gun, and randomly shoots (unnoticed by anybody else) 
a person there. The shot is not lethal, but incapacitates the victim, who later wakes up in a 
hospital. It turns out, however, that this “victim,” a Mafia hitman, went into the theater to 
murder Robert, and was in fact in the process of drawing his own gun when Robert’s bullet 
surprisingly hit him. Did Robert wrong the hitman? Hardly. Due to the fact that the hitman 
was about to murder Robert and his attack was imminent, he has forfeited his right to life, 
and most certainly his right not to be incapacitated. The hitman simply has no valid complaint 
against Robert. 
Given that he is such an excellent shot and that nobody else noticed his shooting, he did 
not actually endanger a concrete person in this concrete situation, nor did he frighten 
anybody. Yet, it is clear that a morality that enjoins agents not to violate the rights of the 
innocent (extreme circumstances covered by necessity justifications set aside), must, on pain 
of irrationality, also enjoin persons to take reasonable precautions to avoid violating the 
rights of the innocent. It therefore cannot be so lenient – or negligent – to allow people to 
impose “inchoate” unreasonable threats on other people.65 (German law speaks of abstrakte 
Gefährdungsdelikte, that is, “offenses of abstract endangerment.) If morality would allow acts 
of this kind, it would allow practices, kinds of behavior that will harm the innocent for no 
good reason. Robert’s act was clearly immoral even without violating anybody’s rights: it is 
not permissible to go into theaters and randomly shoot at people, not even if, accidentally, 
one shoots the “right” person. By acting in the irresponsible way he did act, Robert might not 
have violated the rights of the innocent theatergoers (let alone the rights of the hitman), yet 
he nevertheless showed insufficient respect for them. A deontological morality cannot permit 
such a blatant disrespect for innocent people and their rights.  
Thus, an agent who engages in some act that is normally prohibited since it would 
normally violate the rights of innocent people must be required to have a reasonable belief 
that the objective justifying circumstances are fulfilled precisely in order to keep him from 
unreasonably endangering others.66 And keeping him from unreasonably endangering others 
                                                
65 Again, there are those who would describe Robert’s act as culpable but nevertheless 
permissible. See, for instance, Hurd, Moral Combat, pp. 263-264 for a similar example but a 
different interpretation. For reasons against such interpretations, see the discussion of 
“culpable right action” above. Compare also note 19. 
66 It has been suggested to me that one could simply make a distinction between subjective 
and objective justification here. However, one cannot answer substantive legal or moral 
questions simply by making distinctions. To wit, if the question is whether the legal self-
defense justification requires a subjective element or not, one cannot answer this question by 
saying: “Let’s distinguish between subjective and objective justification.” What we want to 
know is under which conditions a certain act is actually legally or morally justified, and 
either actual justification (instead of only believed or imagined justification, which is no 
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also reduces the likelihood that he actually violates other people’s rights to a reasonable 
level. This rationale of the subjective requirement need not make any appeal to the rights of 
aggressors.67 
 
Conclusion 
While some authors explicitly grant the analytical distinction between rights forfeiture or 
liability on the one hand and permissibility or justification on the other, they nevertheless 
claim that a culpable aggressor’s liability to self-defensive force or to punishment explains 
the defender’s permission to engage in self-defense or to punish the aggressor (at least in a 
large array of cases, that is, barring special circumstances, like necessity prohibitions). In 
contrast, I argued that rights-forfeiture by itself is no path to permissibility at all (even barring 
special circumstances). The limiting conditions of self-defense – necessity, proportionality 
(or no gross disproportionality), and the subjective element – are different in the context of 
forfeiture than in the context of justification (and might even be absent in the former context). 
In particular, I argued that a culpable aggressor, unlike an innocent aggressor, forfeits rights 
against proportionate defense, including unnecessary proportionate defense. Yet, I 
demonstrated that this stance need not lead to the abandonment of the necessity condition of 
justified self-defense in the case of a culpable aggressor. Since justification and liability are 
not the same, there is no reason to assume that the necessity condition of justified self-
defense must be explained under an appeal to the aggressor’s rights. Parallel arguments apply 
to the other limiting conditions. Accordingly, I also sketched alternative explanations of the 
proportionality requirement and the subjective element. All these alternative explanations 
appeal to a principle of precaution: instead of explaining the unjustifiability of unnecessarily 
harming a culpable attacker by an appeal to the rights of the attacker himself, one can also, 
and better, explain it by a requirement to take reasonable precautions against violating the 
                                                                                                                                                  
justification at all) does require a subjective element or it does not. Derek Parfit, for example, 
who makes such distinctions, states that some “act of ours would be wrong in the fact-
relative sense just when this act would be wrong in the ordinary sense if we knew all of the 
morally relevant facts.” Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Volume One (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), p. 150. This definition, however, does not answer any important 
substantive questions about when someone is, in fact, justified. One reason for this is that 
Parfit does not give a clear definition of the “ordinary sense” of justification in the first place. 
Compare Saba Bazargan, “Killing Minimally Responsible Threats,” Ethics 125(1), pp. 114-
136, at 115, note 2. Another and in the present context more important reason is that this 
definition of “wrong in the fact-relative sense” does not answer the question whether 
someone’s subjective state of mind also belongs to the “morally relevant facts” or not. This, 
however, is precisely what we would like to know if we are interested in substantive answers 
as opposed to conceptual fragmentation. 
67 Compare also Fletcher, “The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason,” esp. p. 301. However, 
Fletcher’s reference to the concern about possible future victims of dangerous persons misses 
the agent-relative concern morally responsible people should have about their own dangerous 
behavior.  
26 
 
rights of innocent people.68 
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